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Abstract
Increasingly, complexity-based thinking is challenging the dom-
inant rationalist, realist and reductionist international relations (IR)
framework. However, to move this challenge beyond the academic
realm and into the day-to-day world of policy, complexity thinkers
must begin to develop useful tools for policy practitioners. This pa-
per attempts to address this issue by demonstrating the weaknesses
and limits of one traditional IR tool (X-Y graphic visualizations) and
the strengths of complexity tools (the fitness landscape and range of
complexity outcomes). To demonstrate these arguments we examine
how fitness landscapes can be used to reinterpret traditional perspec-
tives on development and conflict and make difficult problems more
approachable through three-dimensional visualizations.
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Introduction
Complexity-inspired thinking has been seeping into international relations
(IR) for nearly 15 years, from the agent-based and network modelling work
of Robert Axelrod (1997; 2006) and Lars-Erik Cederman (1997) to the
more theoretical work of Robert Jervis (1998) and James Rosenau (2003)
and the historical work of John Lewis Gaddis (2002). Meanwhile, others
(Geyer 2003a; 2003b; Rihani 2002; Urry 2003) have been exploring the
impact of complexity on different sub-fields of IR. We believe that the next
step in exploring and evaluating the usefulness and efficacy of complexity
for IR is to move debates to the more concrete level of examining par-
ticular complexity-inspired concepts and tools. To do so, this article will
briefly review the dominance of the orderly, rationalist and linear frame-
work of mainstream IR and then focus on exploring the potential of two
complexity conceptual tools (fitness landscapes and range of complexity
outcomes)1 on two sub-fields of IR: development theory and distance de-
cay. These complexity conceptual tools were chosen because they have a
powerful visual impact that moves one away from thinking of IR problems
in ‘flatlands’–linear two-dimensional patterns (Tufte 1990).2 Similarly, the
two sub-fields of IR were chosen because they had strong traditions of
‘flatlands’ thinking and were therefore particularly apt for a review from a
complexity perspective. In the conclusion, we argue that these tools can
be useful, are an improvement on traditional IR tools for dealing with com-
plex, emergent problems and can easily be applied to other sub-fields of
IR.
Order and IR theory
Despite multiple waves of debate in modern IR, the dominant framework of
academics and policy actors remains fundamentally orderly, rationalist and
linear–at the pinnacle of which is realism/neo-realism. As Kavalski points
out (citing the work of Hoffmann and Riley [2002] and Johnston [2005]):
Although most IR scholars would agree that the world of
their investigations is complex, they would still insist that the
1To explore the broad range of complexity tools and concepts see Briggs and Peat
(1990), Coveney and Highfield (1995) and Mitleton-Kelly (2003).
2As Tufte argues, ‘Escaping this flatland [of two-dimensionality] is the essential task
of envisioning information–for all the interesting worlds (physical, biological, imaginary,
human) that we seek to understand are inevitably and happily multivariate in nature’ (Tufte
1990, 12).
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proper way for acquiring knowledge about it is through the mod-
elling of linear relationships with homogeneous independent
variables that distinguish between discrete stochastic and sys-
temic effects.
– Kavalski 2007, 446
This approach rests on a foundation of rationalism, bargaining, threats
and opportunities, logical calculation and a belief in some combination
of basic ‘laws’ of human interaction (Burchill et al 2001; Knudsen 1997;
Moses and Knudsen 2007). Its intellectual ‘tools’, inspired by Newtonian
mechanics and neo-classical economics (Beinhocker 2007; Bernstein et
al 2000; Cıˆndea 2006), include: (a) modelling and visualization through
causal and reductionist X-Y graphical modelling, (b) a belief in and pursuit
of stable endpoints and equilibria and (c) a faith in techno-rational decision-
making. All of these three tools reinforce each other. If relationships are
clear, knowable and rational then causal modelling easily applies and one
can establish clear patterns and relationships. Given clear patterns and re-
lationships, the path of history is revealed and clear endpoints are known
and worked towards. Moreover, given these rational and knowable condi-
tions and a clear understanding of the nature of the system and direction
of historical development, then techno-rational elites and decision-making
are the ideal actors for obtaining the best possible outcomes.
However, as has been seen time and time again, the world we live in
is rarely orderly and causal. A quick glance at the unpredictability of the
events of 11 September, uncertain implications of the ‘war on terror’, or
dynamics of the current global economic crisis all show that the world is
made of a complex mixture of order and disorder. These developments
and others have brought IR theory to a state where it is particularly open
to new concepts and ideas from the field of complexity. Comfort (2000)
saw complexity as ‘the greatest opportunity for creative change’ in IR while
Kavalski (2007) argued that it was forming the basis of a ‘fifth debate’ in
the history of IR by creating a ‘cross-pollination between natural and social
sciences’.
However, the link between academic debates and policy actors and ac-
tion is not particularly clear. Though ideas of complexity may have filtered
into the policy world, it is still undoubtedly dominated by the basic concepts
and tools of rationalism and realism. In fact, with a growth of audit-based
public policy, such as New Public Management (Blackman 2001; Power
1997; Scott 1998), rationalist policy approaches and tools seem to be in
the ascendant once again (particularly in the UK). In addition, the political
discourse of popular IR remains dominated by a simplistic bipolar vision of
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global reality, terrorists vs. anti-terrorists replacing the earlier communists
vs. anti-communists. Hence, if complexity is going to have a real impact
on IR it has to go beyond the academic debate and start exploring how
its core concepts and tools can be used in a practical and policy-oriented
manner.
Visualizing causality (X-Y graph) vs. visualizing complex-
ity (fitness landscape)
The classic mental model for visualizing linear causal relationships is the
standard two-dimensional X-Y graph. Though non-linear outcomes can
also be represented on an X-Y graph, from an orderly perspective, ideally
all human systems should be capable of being plotted in a linear fashion
on an X-Y graph and policy actors are strongly encouraged to visualize
their policy problems in these terms. In IR, quantifiable causal modelling
has been a central tool ever since 1945. Arguably, the most influential
example of this type of analysis and visualization can be found in the work
of the esteemed academic and advisor to US President Kennedy, Walter
Rostow.
Rostow’s most influential work, The stages of economic growth: a non-
communist manifesto, written in 1960, set the core framework for the in-
fluential IR sub-field of development theory and policy.Later, Rostow at-
tempted to extend his ‘stages’ thinking to politics, hoping to make the
1970s ‘the Decade of Political Development in something like the sense
that the 1960s has been the Decade of Economic Development’ (Rostow
1971, 5). As is well known, in that work he laid out the five main stages of
development (traditional,3 preconditions for take-off, take-off, drive to ma-
turity and high mass consumption), epitomized by the development of the
US. Though he never graphically represented these stages in his book,
their visualization on an X-Y graph was obvious.
For Rostow, despite various caveats and a recognition of the compli-
cated nature of economic development,4 the development process had
an underlying clear linear progression with an identifiable endpoint (mass
consumption society), ‘the process of development now going forward in
3It is very interesting to note that Rostow identified this ‘traditional’ stage as a ‘pre-
Newtonian’ stage where humans had yet to conceive of their ‘physical environment as
subject to knowable and consistent laws’ (Rostow 1990, 90).
4Interestingly, in a coda to the third edition of The stages of economic growth (1990)
Rostow explored the implications of non-linear thinking on his classic work and concluded
that ‘The Stages is congruent with the insights of non-linear dynamics’ (Rostow 1990,
258).
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Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America as analogous to the stages
of preconditions and take-offs in other societies’ (Rostow 1990, 139). In
essence, by viewing developing countries as fundamentally linear systems
that needed to move up the developmental ladder and stay on track (avoid
communism), one could then apply basic mechanical strategies. As with
any mechanical system, in order to increase its output: add more energy
to the system, improve the parts of the system, promote the better working
parts of the system and eliminate malfunctioning parts.
In order to do this Rostow suggested three policy strategies for those
states moving through the preconditions and take-off stages in order to
maintain democratic development and a Western orientation. These strate-
gies clearly mirror a linear mechanical vision:
• ‘potentialities of external assistance must be organised on an en-
larged and, especially, on a more stable basis’ (Rostow 1990, 142).
– Foreign aid equals energy, therefore more aid will make the sys-
tem develop faster.
• ‘potentials of known technology . . . must be brought to bear’ (Ros-
tow 1990, 143).
– Technology will increase the efficiency of the system, therefore
more technology will make the system develop faster.
• local ‘non-Communist literate elites’ (Rostow 1990, 144) must pro-
vide appropriate leadership and policies.
– Appropriate actors will improve the system, therefore developing
and promoting those actors and blocking/eliminating inappropri-
ate actors will make the system develop faster.
For Western policy actors, the implications were clear: increase and
stabilize foreign aid, encourage large-scale technology transfers and main-
tain high levels of political/diplomatic/military intervention in local politi-
cal/social/economic structures to support appropriate local elites.
Moreover, for Rostow, writing during the height of the Cold War when
the emerging independent nations of the Third World were key regions of
dispute between the East and West, one could clearly see that, in addition
to any humanitarian concerns for the developing world, Rostow’s book was
an attempt to produce a linear counter-model to Karl Marx’s four stages of
development (feudalism, capitalism, socialism, communism) as well as a
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Figure 1: Rostow’s stages of economic growth, represented on an X-Y
graph
guide to avoiding ‘communism: the disease of transition’ (Rostow 1990,
162). For Rostow, this ‘disease’5 was particularly problematic during the
stages of pre-take-off and takeoff. Hence, policymakers had to be ex-
tremely vigilant and interventionist with states passing through this stage.
Visually, this could be represented as in Figure 2.
This framework generated a number of disturbing implications:
• There is an endpoint E (or in the communist case F). The goal is to
get the developing country there fast and stay there. Any strategy
that gets countries to E faster must be better.
• Any strategy that keeps countries on the A to E line longer must be
better and any that moves them up faster must be better. The end
justifies the means.
• Having extensively studied the model, other comparable cases and
the idealtypical model of development (the US), Western experts can
5This metaphor of communism as disease was also used by George Kennan in 1946
in his famous telegram to President Truman.
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know how to get countries from A to E. The key is to identify where
the developing country sits on the developmental path and apply ap-
propriate policy inputs.
• Local knowledge, actors and opinions are of secondary importance.
In fact, buffering the Western experts from their mistaken, misguided
and short-term views may be essential.
• Local actors should be fundamentally passive. TheWestern experts
know how to move the system towards E as fast as possible. Hence,
local actors should do as they are told and repeat the experts’ strate-
gies as much as possible. If something goes wrong, repeat previous
strategies or refer back to Western experts. Experimentation, explo-
ration and learning are best avoided and serve only as a last resort.
• In general, failure to move from A to E quickly or falling off the A to
E line (drifting to communism!) implies a failure to follow the rules
of development. For the Western expert, this situation calls for even
more intensive efforts through greater aid, technology and interven-
tion. For the local actor, it implies that your society is a particularly
backward and problematic one and that you should be increasingly
passive and accepting of external intervention.
Plus c¸a change, plus c’est la meˆme chose
Though extremely popular with policymakers, Rostow’s thinking did not
go unchallenged in academic circles. In fact, most of the major develop-
ment economists and international political economists (Gunnar Myrdal,
Simon Kuznets, Alexander Gerschenkron, Robert Solow) took part in the
debate over Rostow’s work (Rostow 1963). However, despite these chal-
lenges (and later ones: structuralist, dependency and basic needs ap-
proaches) mainstream development policy and approaches remained re-
markably linear and wedded to a belief in clear causal relationships. In
the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s with the rise of the debt crisis in the much
of the developing world the goal shifted from creating ‘mass consumption’
societies to ‘free market’ societies. A new linear development path was
developed that positioned all developing countries along a path towards
full free market development, and appropriate universal policy strategies
(labelled ‘structural adjustment’–reduce state expenditure, balance state
budgets, privatize state industries, open up to international trade) were
7
Figure 2: States succumbing to communism during pre-take-off/take-off
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developed (George 1991; Kosack et al 2005) In essence, one X-Y vision
of the future was replaced by another.
However, as pointed out by the Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang,
this free market goal/vision upheld by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF)/World Bank and backed by major Western powers reflected nei-
ther the reality of advanced industrial states (which maintained extensive
state sectors, used Keynesian economic strategies and had large state-
supported social services) nor the means by which the advanced coun-
tries attained their wealth and position. As Chang notes, ‘Britain and the
US are not the homes of free trade; in fact, for a long time they were the
most protectionist countries in the world ... the best-performing economies
have been those that opened up their economies selectively and gradually’
(Chang 2007, 17).
Major international policy actors (World Bank, IMF, UN) were aware of
the failure and inconsistencies of these plans (Dollar and Svensen 1998;
World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). The problem
was that so long as they remained locked into a linear framework, visual-
ized by the X-Y graph, they constantly returned to variations of the same
underlying strategy. In essence, since the framework is assumed to be cor-
rect, but the strategy didn’t work then to make it work, the system needs
(a) more energy/money and/or (b) improved inputs and/or (c) increased
control over the local actors, as William Easterly, a former employee of the
World Bank, makes abundantly clear in the repetitive quotations presented
in Table 1.
As Easterly goes on to argue, the ‘lack of historical memory in the aid
community... (and) the unchanging approach to many of these desirable
objectives shows again that aid agencies keep throwing in more and more
resources to try and reach a predetermined, although unattainable, goal’
(Easterly 2006, 200). Most recently, as pointed out by Easterly, this type of
thinking leads to a form of ‘postmodern’ imperialism for persistently ‘failed
states’ (Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, etc). This position, outlined in various
articles in the influential journal Foreign Affairs, has significantly influenced
current US foreign policy towards these states. As the academic Stephen
Krasner, who became a policy advisor to the US State Department in 2005,
argued:
In the future, better domestic governance in badly governed,
failed, states and occupied polities will require the transcen-
dence of accepted rules, including the creation of shared sovereignty
in specific areas. In some cases, decent governance may re-
quire some new form of trusteeship, almost certainly de facto
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Figure 3: Different visions of the future
rather than de jure.
– Krasner 2004, 85
From this perspective, as outlined in Figure 3, the framework of linear
development remains, the key crisis period stays the same, and the only
difference is the perceived negative endpoint. In the 1960s and 1970s it
was ‘communism’, in the late 1980s and 1990s it was ‘non-free-market
states’ and in the 2000s it became ‘failed states’.
A different point of view: the fitness landscape
For simple orderly phenomena and systems, the X-Y graph is an excellent
tool. To visualize and calculate the movements of balls on a table, the
trajectory of missiles, etc. the X-Y graph is all you need. However, for
complex systems you need a way of modelling and imagining a system that
can move in varying and unpredictable ways over time. You need a way to
show the probability of a system to move in a multitude of directions, a way
to show how the system ‘fits’ with varying situations and circumstances.
You need a fitness landscape.
Fitness landscapes were originally designed by population and evolu-
tionary biologists and used in a variety of modelling applications (Coveney
and Highfield 1995; Kauffman 1995), and are mathematically represented
on a threedimensional X-Y-Z graph. In this three-dimensional visualization,
valleys represent areas of poor fitness, mountains represent high fitness
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and flatlands represent areas of neutral fitness.6 In other words, biolog-
ical complex systems, such as schools of fish, herds of buffalo, or en-
tire species, are constantly moving through an evolving fitness landscape
where new predators, food sources and numerous other factors combine
to influence their chances for survival. Some of the basic rules for survival
on a fitness landscape are adaptability, flexibility, learning and balance.
For example, for our herd of buffalo if a new more nutritious grass be-
gan to grow on their normal grazing land the fitness landscape of the herd
would improve, more buffalo would adapt to the new situation by eating
more of the nutritious grass and over time the population would increase.
However, the increasing numbers might overgraze the new grass (which
could take longer to recover than older grasses) and the fitness landscape
for the herd would now be ‘poor’. The herd might attempt to adapt to the
new ‘landscape’ by searching for new grazing areas or if the herd remained
in the same area the population might decline. Fundamentally, as long as
the ‘system’ survives, the fitness landscape continues to evolve through
time like a never-ending conveyor belt.
Obviously, it does not take much of an imaginary leap to see how fit-
ness landscapes relate to the situations of human complex systems. To
begin, imagine a landscape that is full of flatlands, valleys and mountains
and stretches endlessly into the future. Now, imagine that the valleys rep-
resent zones of poor performance, the mountains are zones of good per-
formance and the flatlands are areas of neutral performance. Moreover,
imagine that the further you peer into the future the hazier the detail and
definition of mountains, valleys and flatlands become.
Linear versus complex outcomes
Now before we go into our case studies, we need to clarify one other key
difference between the linear X-Y graph and fitness landscape visualiza-
tions. As we saw in Figures 1–3 above, the outcomes of our linear X-Y
visualizations had a strong either/or character. The developing country
was either on track (progressing towards the proper endpoint, mass con-
sumption society, etc.) or off the track (heading to communism). It was
either making progress or it was stagnant. It was either a success (an ex-
ample for others to follow) or failure (in need of more aid, technology and
external intervention). This represents a much larger and deeper trend in
social science and public policy: the belief in the creation of human order,
6Equating up with fitness and down with lack of fitness is an arbitrary designation. It
could easily be reversed, as Gell-Mann (1994) does.
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which can be traced back through the works of Hegel, Condorcet, Bacon
and beyond. Basically, since nature is fundamentally orderly, then humans
must be as well. The key for the social sciences and public policy actors is
to eliminate disorder and uncertainty and to create greater order. From this
perspective, viewing society and public policy as an evolving balancing act
between emerging order and disorder is an admission of intellectual and
policy failure.
On the other hand, from a complexity perspective, humans must con-
stantly seek the appropriate balance between order and disorder in their
symbiotically evolving environment. Acting on and in an evolving com-
plex system that changes with their own actions, individuals’ and groups’
choices become more uncertain the more detailed they become. At an
individual level, we know that we must remain active to stay healthy, but
which kind of activity is best for us and do we find most enjoyable? For
a particular school, it must certainly cover the basic educational needs of
its pupils, but what types of specialisms should it have and are these the
most relevant to the needs of the larger community? At a national pol-
icy level, maintaining a competent police force is a necessary policy, but
what combination of local and centralized policing structures is the best
and how should the force be structured to meet the different needs of ru-
ral/urban communities? At the international level, observing international
law is generally a good thing. But will allowing a convicted terrorist bomber
to return to their home country based on compassionate legal principles
(Scotland’s release of the Lockerbie plane bomber to Libya in August 2009)
significantly undermine Scottish relations with the US or will the incident be
forgotten in a post-summer haze? In essence, policy actors must continu-
ally strive for the zone of creative complexity on a broad range of potential
outcomes. In a very simplistic fashion, this range can be represented as
in Figure 4.
In contrast to the linear X-Y perspective, the most difficult areas for
complex systems to survive in are in the realms order and disorder. In a
realm of strict order, actors are stripped of their ability to make local deci-
sions, freely interact and respond to emergent developments in new ways.
This is the zone of the most rigid authoritarian and totalitarian regimes
where virtually every major aspect of life is structured (USSR under Stalin,
Cambodia under Pol Pot, Afghanistan under the Taliban, etc). Likewise,
the realm of disorder is one where human actors struggle to make any
local connections or interactions because they are so unpredictable. Peri-
ods of extreme social disorder or civil war, where all trust evaporates in a
cloud of fear, are key examples (Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the Sudan in
the 1990s are all recent examples).
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The realms of stifling order and destructive disorder are much more
common and can provide stable outcomes for complex human systems.
Under stifling order, for example, central actors apply overly rigid criteria
upon local actors who are forced to fulfil these criteria to the detriment of
obvious local problems and opportunities, for example when a particular
ethnic, social or gender group is only allowed to perform certain social or
economic tasks (untouchables in India, women under strict Islamic law,
etc). Equally negative outcomes can occur under destructive disorder. In
this case, the system lacks a clear structure or suffers under constantly
shifting rules. The political fate of the Iraqi people struggling to cope in the
aftermath of the US occupation is a clear example.
The realm of creative complexity is generally the most productive for
human systems. It combines a stable evolving framework that establishes
core boundaries with as wide a variety of local interactions as possible.
Systems in this realm have a general direction, but are not rigidly locked
into a particular pathway. As explained by the economist Ha-Joon Chang
(mentioned above), all of the successful advanced industrial economies
have adapted, shifted and responded to evolving conditions throughout
their economic development. A combination of external and internal fac-
tors has allowed them to explore, make mistakes, learn as they went along
and balance within the realm of creative complexity for lengthy periods of
time.
In opposition to the implications of the linear framework, a complexity
framework has a number of commonsensical implications:
• There is no endpoint to a fitness landscape nor is there any final
resting point. The primary goal and tactic are adaptation and balance
to changing circumstances.
• The main actors on treks on the fitness landscape are the actors/countries/
societies themselves. They are actively moving through the land-
scape and making essential choices. Their opinions, experiences
and learning matter. External experts are secondary.
• External intervention is always problematic. In general, the simpler
it is, the higher the probability of success (if a population is starving
send in food aid). The more detailed and complicated the interven-
tion, the lower the likelihood of success. The US’s attempt to restruc-
ture the entire political system of Iraq in 12 months after the fall of
Saddam Hussein is a prime example.
• Learning is essential and never stops. Being aware, making choices,
experimenting, exploring is how an individual, institution or country
14
Figure 4: Range of outcomes
learns about their particular landscape and evolve tactics for dealing
with the inevitable unknown.
• Mistakes, misdirections and occasional stumbles into valleys of low
fitness are normal and not a mark of weakness/failure, a lack of de-
velopment and/or inferiority. The only mistake is refusing to see them
as normal and not learning from them.
• Change is normal. Desperately repeating the tactics of the past (or
of other more successful states/nations) is no guarantee of future
success.
Case study one: a fitness landscape for development
As we have argued above, the post-1945 development project, despite
various revisions, seeks to guide a nation, or community, ‘in need of devel-
opment’, along a predetermined path, with supposedly clear signposts that
have been charted by earlier pioneers, to a specified end-state of ‘develop-
ment’. The country to be developed is positioned on a certain level on the
development ladder and appropriate policies are applied until it reaches
the ‘equilibrium’ point of the fully developed countries. Once there it is
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Figure 5: A fitness landscape view of development
then stable and in the words of Francis Fukuyama, it has reached the ‘end
of history’.
However, as the mixed results of development plans and aid demon-
strate, development is not a linear process and even the currently suc-
cessful countries used a variety of directions/policies/institutions/cultures
and created, over lengthy periods of time, distinctive outcomes that can
be generally packaged as ‘developed’. A linear X–Y graph could hardly be
used to present an illustration of that concept of development. Visually and
metaphorically, the next step away from traditional thinking is to visualize
development occurring on a threedimensional fitness landscape such as
is shown in Figures 5 and 6.7
In these basic fitness landscapes,8 we combined three factors:
7Both figures were originally published in Geyer and Rihani (2010, permission was
kindly granted for a reprint of the images by the publisher). Please note, that in order
to avoid data overlap, the figures for state expenditure as a percentage of GDP were
averaged for the 1971–2006 period, creating the impression that the relationship did not
change over time. Interestingly, in the case of our advanced industrial countries, the rela-
tionship was generally remarkably stable. Unsurprisingly, the least successful economies
often fluctuated wildly.
8It should be noted that our fitness landscapes presented in Figures 5, 6 and 11 are
not fitness landscapes as defined by Stuart Kauffmann (1995) and others. In their defini-
tion, the fitness landscape examines the interrelationship between the factors influencing
the fitness of a particular actor or set of actors in a given state/system. In our simpli-
fied fitness landscapes, though we use a three-dimensional structure, there is no direct
interrelationship between the countries and their economic performance or the level of
conflict that they experience. Hence, we are unable to examine the interrelationships that
create this particular three-dimensional outcome. However, as a metaphorical tool for
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Figure 6: Another fitness landscape view of development
• (X axis) Annual growth rates (reported by the UN National Accounts).
• (Y axis) A simplistic range of how disorderly–orderly the society was.
To generate this disorder–order scale we used the UN National Ac-
counts and looked at state expenditure as a percentage of gross
national product (a very general indication of how much the state
controls the economy). The more state control, the more order. The
less state control, the less order.
• (Z axis) Time, 1971–2006.
Obviously, this is only a very rough indication of how much a society is
held in an orderly state or caught in a disorderly conundrum. Nevertheless,
some very revealing patterns emerged.
For the successful advanced industrial countries:
• Unsurprisingly, they tended to be bunched towards the middle, ex-
hibiting a mix of state–market/order–disorder (avoiding extremes of
order or disorder).
• Interestingly, despite their being in the middle, there is a remarkably
broad range of market–state and disorder–order variety. For exam-
ple, Sweden (on average) has nearly twice as much state dominance
of the economy as Japan and almost three times as much as Hong
moving away from traditional linear interpretations we believe that these simplified fitness
landscapes are valid and conform to a general complexity framework.
17
Kong. Hence, as many others have argued, there is no single road
to success, but a wide variety of strategies.
• Moreover, for most cases, the key to success is continual small-scale
improvements over long periods of time. As the data show, with some
famous exceptions, there is no ‘rush for growth’.
For the less successful countries:
• Being too orderly or disorderly can be equally bad. On the orderly
extreme, North Korea reported reasonable growth rates until the mid-
1970s and then went into a steady decline as it became more and
more rigid and less and less capable of successfully interacting with
the increasingly globalized world.
• At the other end of the spectrum in Afghanistan, where there is a
lengthy history of civil division and strife and almost constant war
since the late 1970s, growth rates fluctuate wildly with the constantly
changing security situation.
• Unsurprisingly, both of these cases score very poorly on Transparency
International’s rating of corruption indicators. (See http://www.transparency.
org/.)
• Lurching from one extreme to the other creates the worst possible
of all worlds. Iraq was caught in a zone of stifling order under the
regime of Saddam Hussein, who (inadvertently aided by the UN em-
bargo) rigidly dominated all major aspects of the Iraqi economy. Sub-
sequently, despite the successful US-led invasion of 2003 and huge
efforts to develop the country, it fell into a zone of destabilizing disor-
der.
What are the general implications of this re-imaging of development
from a complexity perspective? First, development is revealed as a pro-
cess of exploration with a desired general direction in mind. There are
some rules to follow: create a stable institutional framework, encourage
decentralized interactions, avoid civil strife and a stifling state structure,
etc. There is no perfect or aggregate pattern for exactly how a country
should stay within these boundaries. Hence, detailed prescriptions of what
should be done in the long term are likely to be ineffective or counterpro-
ductive. Moreover, from a complexity framework, the development project
will set out to improve a nation’s performance within continually shifting
conditions by means of enhancing its members’ fitness and capability. The
process is ongoing and the outcome is not preordained.
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Case study two: complexity and distance decay
Another aspect of IR theory which can benefit from the complexity ap-
proach is the concept of distance decay. This idea was used widely during
the Cold War not only in IR theory but also in economics (Isard 1956; Tin-
bergen 1962; 1965; Cobb and Elder 1970; Hughes 1972; Merritt and Clark
1977). The study of the effect of distance on conflict goes back to antiq-
uity,9 but more recently, as new datasets have become available, there
has been a renewed interest in the notion of distance decay (Gleditsch
and Ward 2001; Buhaug and Gates 2002; Murdoch and Sandler 2004;
Robst et al 2007; Hegre 2008). Distance decay is a useful concept, but
complexity can help us to understand some of its strengths and limits.
Boxers, neighbours and boils
The basic reason why distance is considered to be such an important vari-
able in conflict research can be reduced to three analogies: boxers, neigh-
bours and boils. Bremer expressed the boxer argument in its simplest
form: ‘Boxers, after all, cannot fight until they are physically able to reach
one another’ (Bremer 1992, 312). Wesley used a neighbour analogy to
develop the theory of interaction opportunities, ‘A man is much more likely
to quarrel with his next-door neighbor than with someone several houses
removed. Interactions of all sorts, both constructive as well as destructive,
are more frequent between people in adjacent areas than those widely
separated geographically’ (Wesley 1962, 387). Wesley extended this argu-
ment to a geographically deterministic extent, arguing that ‘the frequency
of wars and the size of wars may be derived on the basis of geographical
opportunity alone’ (Wesley 1962, 387). Finally, Zipf utilized the boils anal-
ogy in his Principle of least effort: ‘If we listen to proverbs, “a boil on your
own neck will worry you more than a famine in China’; yet as your location
is ever nearer to China, the comparative magnitude of your worry about
the famine will increase proportionately–even to the point that the boil is
forgotten’ (Zipf 1949, 391).
Many theorists approaching IR from a geopolitical perspective regarded
9For Sun Tzu, distance was one of two factors to consider in determining the impact
that ‘ground’ would have on the success of a military campaign; the other was rugged or
mountainous terrain. Indeed, distance and terrain are two sides of the same coin: Sun
Tzu’s commentator, Ho Yen-hsi, tells us that “Ground” includes both distances and type
of terrain’ (Sun Tzu 1963, IV.18). Clausewitz (1968) went on to spend four chapters of On
war looking at the military implications of mountainous terrain. Rugged or mountainous
terrain is very closely related to distance, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
19
Figure 7: Boulding’s loss of strength gradient. Notes: Left is based on
Boulding (1962, Figure 12.2, p. 232); right increases distance between A
and B.
distance as being perhaps the single most important variable in under-
standing conflict. Spykman argued that ‘power is effective in inverse ratio
to the distance from its source’ (Spykman 1942, 448). Similarly, George
Kennan made the case that ‘the effectiveness of the power radiated from
any one national center decreases in proportion to the distance involved’
(Kennan 1961, 276). The most referred to visual representation of this
idea is Boulding’s (1962) loss of strength gradient (LSG), reproduced in
Figure 7.
In these two versions of Boulding’s Figure 12.2, A and B are states;
the heights of the lines H and K represent the power of those states. The
diagonal lines represent the decline in power as distance from the states
increases. If we consider the two states to be India and Sri Lanka, the left-
hand diagram shows that India is always stronger than Sri Lanka, even in
Sri Lanka’s home base. However, in the right-hand diagram the distance
between the two states is increased: imagine that Sri Lanka was suddenly
moved to the Pacific Ocean. Now, although the absolute power of the two
states has remained the same, the relative power has changed: India is
no longer more powerful than Sri Lanka in Sri Lanka’s home base.
Yet it has been long realized that regarding distance decay as purely
linear was too simplistic. Even Boulding, though arguing that ‘deviations
from linearity are not likely to be great’ (Boulding 1962, 231), admitted
that loss of strength lines would not always be straight. Later, Wohlstetter
pointed out that the effect of distance is ‘very much more complex than is
recognized by linear theories of the weakening of strength with distance’
(Wohlstetter 1968, 252). Nevertheless, a simple, linear view of the impor-
tance of distance continued to dominate the field. As O’Loughlin, long a
critic of simple geographic determinism, pointed out in 2000, ‘For the IR
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modelers, the world had effectively become a billiard-table, an isotropic
geopolitical plain, but at a cost’ (O’Loughlin 2000, 7).
To understand the importance and attraction of such thinking consider
the map (Figure 8) presented in Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction: the
assessment of the British government (British Government 2002), also
known as the infamous ‘dodgy dossier’. There is nothing distinctive about
this map. It is similar to a multitude of force/power maps that can be found
in a range of post-1945 policy documents and academic papers. Here, one
sees four distance bands, each indicating the idealized maximum range
of five different types of missile. For what it does, the map is correct:
the isobars give a reasonably accurate indication of the parts of the world
which could be reached by a missile capable of travelling 150, 650, 900 or
1200km from within the territory of Iraq. However, even this relatively sim-
plified system (achievable distances of certain types of missiles) ignores
a range of complex variables, including weather patterns, variety and po-
sition of targets, weapons imprecision, etc, that could significantly affect
the actual missile range outcomes. More importantly, this simplified map
had a second goal in the context of the ‘dodgy dossier’. It was designed to
clearly demonstrate the expanding and extensive range of Iraqi power and
the subsequent need to contain and limit that power. In essence, a linear
tool was used to simplify a complex power situation in order to justify later
intervention.Without a proper recognition of its limits, a linear LSG tool is
open to significant misuse and misinterpretation.
This does not imply that the LSG is no longer viable or useful or that
it cannot be used in complex situations. However, one must recognize its
limits. For example, recently Buhaug made the first application of the LSG
to civil war. He refined the notion of just using lines in the LSG to represent
distance; for him, such lines represent ‘not only geographic distance but
all sorts of factors that might affect the LSG, including type of terrain, level
of infrastructure and logistics capabilities, extent of local support, cultural
dissimilarities, and morale’ (Buhaug forthcoming, 6). However, on a prac-
tical level, he found that data restrictions mean that a simple geographic
proxy had to be used. This led Buhaug to use the visualization shown in
Figure 9.
In this case, G represents the home base of a government (the capital
city), while R represents the base of a rebel group. In the left-hand diagram
the government is assured of military victory, while in the right-hand dia-
gram the rebel group’s relative strength is greater than the government’s;
indeed, its strength is greater than the government’s at all points to the
right of E, which represents equal strength.
We would like to take this visualization of the data on civil conflict one
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Figure 8: ‘Current and Planned/Potential Ballistic Missiles,’ originally pre-
sented as Figure 7 in Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assess-
ment of the British Government (British Government 2002, 31).
Figure 9: Buhaug’s application of the LSG on a civil basis (originally pre-
sented as Figure 1 in Buhaug forthcoming)
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Figure 10: One half of the LSG, using number of incidences of conflict for
an inverse proxy for Boulding’s understanding of strength
step further by integrating it into a fitness landscape. To do this, the Armed
Conflict Location Event Dataset (ACLED), a PRIO data project, will be
used (see Raleigh and Hegre 2005). It contains details on 4746 conflict
events in 13 African states between 1960 and 2006.10 Each of these con-
flicts has been geo-coded with latitude and longitude variables, 97 per
cent of which are accurate to the village level. By calculating the distance
of each of these conflict events from the capital city of the state in which
it is located, we can make some observations about the extent of govern-
ment control within the state. If we follow Buhaug’s (forthcoming) lead and
apply the LSG on an intrastate basis, we may expect the state’s power
to be greatest at the capital city and weakest in those parts of the state
furthest from the capital city. To do this, the number of conflict events for
each state in ACLED can be used as an inverse proxy for strength and
order: the more conflict events, the less strength and more disorder. This
works slightly differently from Buhaug’s application; instead of giving sep-
arate gradients for the government and rebel groups, only one line is used,
representing the government’s ability to control. In theory, the government
should be most able to exercise its control (and thus retain order) at the
core/capital. Disorder should be greatest at the periphery. Incidences of
conflict, then, may be used to demonstrate disorder. Given these expec-
tations and applying them in a linear fashion to a fitness landscape results
10More data items on more states are now becoming available. See the ACLED web-
site, ,http://www.acleddata.com, for the most recent version of the dataset.
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Figure 11: ACLED data applied to a simple fitness landscape
in an idealized three-dimensional version of one-half11 of Boulding’s LSG
(Figure 10).
On the X axis we have a range between the seat of government on
the righthand side (the core, representing order and control) and the state
periphery (representing disorder and lack of control) on the left. The Y
axis is the level of conflict: down is more conflict; up is less conflict.12 The
Z axis represents the various states. By using a fitness landscape in this
way, we are able to control for state shape and size: all states become
equal.
Interestingly and unsurprisingly, when we apply the data from ACLED13
it generates a very different fitness landscape than what was expected in
our idealized linear Boulding LSG model (see Figure 11).
As we can see, this is very different from the fitness landscape pre-
sented in Figure 10. In some instances, conflict is greatest in the capital;
in some it is greatest at the periphery; overall, no clear pattern emerges.
However, a number of core points can be made.
• Linear models of power and conflict (like the LSG) must be used very
carefully and with a full recognition of their distorting character.
11Like Buhaug, we have chosen to present only one-half of the LSG. The methods used
to create these fitness curves would make the other half of the diagram inappropriate.
12This is in line with our earlier decision to equate up with fitness and down with lack of
fitness. Again, the reverse would be equally valid.
13Eight of the 13 ACLED states have been selected for this figure because they suffered
more incidences of conflict. The states have been ordered alphabetically.
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• Visualizations have an impact beyond their academic meaning. Sim-
plified visualizations like the ‘dodgy dossier’ will have a tendency to
simplify and polarize discussions and debates about complex inter-
national situations. This may be politically expedient for some actors,
but has the potential of leading international policy actors (and the
public) into extremely problematic contexts and situations.
• The nature of conflict is multi-faceted even when one looks at it from
a simplified LSG framework.
• Concepts of time and change are essential. Figure 11 is a represen-
tation of the fitness landscape for the period 1960–2006. There is no
guarantee that a similar landscape would emerge in a subsequent
period.
• Like all complex interactions, conflict exhibits both orderly and dis-
orderly elements. Degrees of probability are the best that one can
hope to achieve. A complexity perspective implicitly recognizes this
uncertainty, and its tools allow us to visualize it.
• Finally, there are a whole range of interesting implications from these
data and visualizations (such as comparing larger time frames, dif-
ferent country combinations, different regions, etc) which we have
not explored in this article. Subsequent work is obviously required.
Conclusion
The main thrust of this article has not been to restate the arguments for
complexity or its general relevance to IR, but to examine the relevance and
efficacy of two conceptual tools of complexity on two sub-fields of IR. From
the discussion above, complexity tools such as fitness landscapes and
range of complexity outcomes are relevant and, with their visual power,
can have a significant impact on how policy actors and the public interpret
development policy and policies towards conflict areas. In both cases, un-
der traditional IR approaches the tendency was to use linear tools to create
simplified yes/no, right/wrong outcomes that projected a sense of mechan-
ical dynamics that had a particular endpoint and should be directed by
appropriate technical elites/experts. From a complexity perspective, it is
both misguided and dangerous to use linear tools to analyse evolving and
emergent complex systems and situations.
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Finally, we believe that these complexity conceptual tools will be rel-
evant to other sub-disciplines in IR, since most international policy areas
exhibit elements of complexity and complex dynamics and it is only with
a full understanding of complexity that reasonable policy outcomes can
be achieved. However, further studies are needed to confirm this belief.
In essence, if the complexity-inspired ‘fifth debate’ in IR (as Kavalski put
it) is to progress, the strategy of exploring the relevance and efficacy of
complexity tools on IR sub-disciplines must continue.
References
Axelrod, Robert (1997) Complexity of cooperation: agent based models of
competition and collaboration (New York: Princeton University Press)
Axelrod, Robert (2006) The evolution of cooperation (New York: Basic
Books)
Beinhocker, Eric (2007) The origin of wealth: evolution, complexity, and
the radical remaking of economics (New York: Random House)
Bernstein, Steven et al (2000) ‘God gave physics the easy problems:
adopting social science to an unpredictable world’, European Journal of
International Relations, 6:1, 43–76
Blackman, Tim (2001) ‘Complexity theory and the new public manage-
ment’, Social Issues, 1:2, ,http://www.whb.co.uk/socialissues/tb.htm,
accessed 2 March 2011
Boulding, Kenneth (1962) Conflict and defense: a general theory (New
York: Harper Torchbooks)
Bremer, Stuart A (1992) ‘Dangerous dyads: conditions affecting the
likelihood of interstate war, 1816–1965’, Journal of Conflict Resolution,
36:2, 309–341
Briggs, J and FD Peat (1990) Turbulent mirror: an illustrated guide to
chaos theory and the science of wellness (New York: Harper & Row)
British Government (2002) Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction: the
assessment of the British government (London: Stationery Office)
Buhaug, Halvard (forthcoming) ‘Dude, where’s my conflict? LSG, rel-
ative strength, and the location of civil war’, Conflict Management and
Peace Science
Buhaug, Halvard and Scott Gates (2002) ‘The geography of civil war’,
Journal of Peace Research, 39:4, 417–433
Burchill, Scott et al (2001) Theories of international relations (New York:
Palgrave)
26
Cederman, Lars-Erik (1997) Emergent actors in world politics: how
states and nations develop and dissolve (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press)
Chang, Ha-Joon (2007) Bad Samaritans: rich nations, poor policies
and the threat to the developing world (New York: Random House)
Cıˆndea, Ion (2006) ‘Complex systems–new conceptual tools for inter-
national relations’, Perspectives, 14:1, 46–68 Clausewitz, General Carl
von (1968) On war, transl Colonel JJ Graham (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul)
Cobb, Roger Wand Charles Elder (1970) International community: a
regional and global study (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston)
Comfort, Louise (2000) ‘Disaster’, Cambridge Review of International
Affairs, 14:1, 277–294
Coveney, P and R Highfield (1995) Frontiers of complexity: the search
for order in a chaotic world (London: Faber & Faber)
Dollar, David and Jakob Svensen (1998) ‘What explains the success or
failure of structural adjustment programs?’, World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper 1938, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=569231.
Easterly,William (2006) The white man’s burden: why the West’s efforts
to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good (London: Penguin)
Gaddis, John L (2002) The landscape of history: how historians map
the past (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Gell-Mann, M (1994) The quark and the jaguar (Boston: Little, Brown)
George, Susan (1991) The debt boomerang: how Third World debt
harms us all (London: Pluto Press)
Geyer, Robert (2003a) ‘European integration, the problem of complex-
ity and the revision of theory’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 41:1,
15–35
Geyer, Robert (2003b) ‘The end of globalisation and Europeanisation,
rise of complexity and future of Scandinavian exceptionalism’, Governance,
16:4, 559–577
Geyer, Robert and Samir Rihani (2010) Complexity and public policy:
a new approach to 21st century politics, policy and society (London: Rout-
ledge)
Gleditsch, Kristian S and Michael Ward (2001) ‘Measuring space: a
minimum-distance database and applications to international studies’, Jour-
nal of Peace Research, 38:6, 739–758
Hegre, Ha◦vard (2008) ‘Gravitating toward war: preponderance may
pacify, but power kills’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53:4, 566–589
27
Hoffman, Matthew and John Riley (2002) ‘The science of political sci-
ence’, New Political Science, 24:4, 302–320
Hughes, Barry B (1972) ‘Transaction data and analysis: in search of
concepts’, International Organization, 26:4, 659–680
Isard, Walter (1956) Location and space-economy: a general theory
relating to industrial location, market areas, land use, trade, and urban
structure (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)
Jervis, R (1998) System effects (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press)
Johnston, Alastair (2005) ‘Towards mid-range theorizing’, International
Organization, 59:4, 1013–1044
Kauffman, Stuart (1995) At home in the universe: the search for the
laws of self-organization and complexity (London: Viking)
Kavalski, Emilian (2007) ‘The fifth debate and the emergence of com-
plex international relations theory: notes on the application of complexity
theory to the study of international life’, Cambridge Review of International
Affairs, 20:3, 435–454
Kennan, George F (1961) Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin
(London: Hutchinson)
Knudsen, Torbjørn (1997) A history of international relations, 2nd edn
(Manchester: Manchester University Press)
Kosack, Stephen, Gustav Ranis and James Vreeland (eds) (2005) Glob-
alization and the nation state: the impact of the IMF and the World Bank
(London: Routledge)
Krasner, Stephen D (2004) ‘Sharing sovereignty: new institutions for
collapsed and failing states’, International Security, 29:2, 85–120
Merritt, Richard L and Caleb M Clark (1977) ‘An example of data use:
mail flows in the European balance of power, 1890–1920’ in Karl W Deutsch,
Bruno Fritsch, Helio
Jaguaribe and Andrei S Markovits (eds) Problems of world modeling:
political and social implications (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger), 169–205
Mitleton-Kelly, Eve (2003) Complex systems and evolutionary perspec-
tives on organisations: the application of complexity theory to organisa-
tions (London: Pergamon)
Moses, Jonathon and Torbjørn Knudsen (2007) Ways of knowing: com-
peting methodologies in social and political research (New York: Palgrave)
Murdoch, James C and Todd Sandler (2004) ‘Civil wars and economic
growth: spatial dispersion’, American Journal of Political Science, 48:1,
138–151
O’Loughlin, John (2000) ‘Geography as space and geography as place:
the divide between political science and political geography continues’,
28
Geopolitics, 5, 126–137
Power, M (1997) The audit society: rituals of verification (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press)
Raleigh, Clionadh and Ha◦vard Hegre (2005) ‘Introducing ACLED: an
armed conflict location and event dataset’, paper presented to the confer-
ence on ‘Disaggregating the
Study of Civil War and Transnational Violence’, University of California
Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, San Diego, 7–8 March
Rihani, S (2002) Complex systems theory and development practice:
understanding non-linear realities (London: Zed Books)
Robst, John, Solomon Polachek and Yuan-Ching Chang (2007) ‘Ge-
ographic proximity, trade, and international conflict/cooperation’, Conflict
Management and Peace Science, 24, 1–27
Rosenau, James (2003) Distant proximities: dynamics beyond global-
ization (New York: Princeton University Press)
Rostow, W (ed) (1963) The economics of take-off into sustained growth
(New York: Macmillan)
Rostow, Walter (1971) Politics and the stages of growth (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press)
Rostow, Walter (1990) The stages of economic growth: a non-communist
manifesto, 3rd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Scott, J (1998) Seeing like a state (New Haven: Yale University Press)
Spykman, Nicholas John (1942) America’s strategy in world politics:
the United States and the balance of power (New York: Harcourt, Brace)
Sun, Tzu (1963) The Art of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Tinbergen, Jan (1962) Shaping the world economy: suggestions for an
international economic policy (New York: Twentieth Century Fund)
Tinbergen, Jan (1965) International Economic Integration, 2nd rev edn
(Amsterdam: Elsevier)
Tufte, Edward (1990) Envisioning information (Cheshire, CT: Graphics
Press)
Urry, John (2003) Global complexity (Cambridge: Polity Press)
Wesley, James Paul (1962) ‘Frequency of wars and geographical op-
portunity’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6:4, 387–389
Wohlstetter, Albert (1968) ‘Illusions of distance’, Foreign Affairs, 46:2,
242–255
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our com-
mon future (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Zipf, George Kingsley (1949) Human behavior and the principle of least
effort: an introduction to human ecology (New York: Hafner)
29
